Declassified Documents Describe Stealth Facility in Nevada
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 443
Posted – October 29, 2013
Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson
For more information contact:
Jeffrey T. Richelson 202/994 7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu
Washington, D.C., October 29, 2013 – The CIA's history of the U-2 spy plane,
declassified this past summer, sparked enormous public attention
to the U-2's secret test site at Area 51 in Nevada, but documents posted today by the National Security Archive (
www.nsarchive.org)
show that Area 51 played an even more central role in the development
of the U.S. Air
Force's top secret stealth programs in the 1970s and 1980s, and
hosted secretly obtained Soviet MiG fighters during the Cold War.
Compiled and edited by Archive senior fellow Jeffrey T.
Richelson, today's e-book posting includes more than 60 declassified
documents. Some of the documents specifically focus on Area 51 and the
concern for maintaining secrecy about activities at the facility.
Included is a 1961 memo (
Document 1) from the CIA's inspector general raising the issue of security, and a response (
Document 2) reporting the shared concerns of
the CIA Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell. Security concerns led to consideration (
Document 3) of photographing the area with U.S.
reconnaissance assets and a debate (
Document 4,
Document 5) over the possible release of a photograph of the facility taken by SKYLAB
astronauts.
Bird of Prey. Photo credit: National Museum of the United States Air Force.
Other documents focus on the aircraft tested at the facility (and
their operational use) — particularly the stealth F-117. Those
documents include a variety of
histories of the F-117 squadron, with details on participation in
operations and exercises. In addition, there are extracts from two
reports (
Document 15,
Document 16) on accidents involving F-117 aircraft, as well as histories and assessments (
Document 17,
Document 18,
Document 23,
Document 36) of F-117 deployment in operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Also included are fact
sheets (
Document 58,
Document 59,
Document 60) concerning three programs, at least two of which were tested at Area 51 — the Bird
of Prey and TACIT BLUE.
In addition to documents on F-117 operations, a number of
documents focus on the development of stealth capability. One of those (
Document 10),
is the mathematical
analysis by Russian physicist and engineer P. Ya. Ufimtsev that
former Lockheed Skunk Works director Ben Rich called "the Rosetta Stone
breakthrough
for stealth technology."
Also represented in the posting is another type of activity at
Area 51 — the exploitation of covertly acquired Soviet MiGs. Included is
a 300-page
Defense Intelligence Agency report (
Document 50) on the exploitation of the MiG-21, a project titled HAVE DOUGHNUT. Other documents (
Document 51,
Document 52) concern the exploitation effort concerning two MiG-17s, efforts named HAVE DRILL and HAVE FERRY.
Area 51, Secret Aircraft and Soviet MiGs
Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson
TACIT BLUE. Photo credit: National Museum of the United States Air Force.
Area 51 has the been the focus of enormous interest among a
significant segment of the public for decades — an interest that
inevitably spawned books,
articles, and a variety of documentaries.
1
For some enthusiasts Area 51 was a clandestine site for UFOs and
extraterrestrials, but it is better understood as a U.S. government
facility for the
testing of a number of U.S. secret aircraft projects — including the
U-2, OXCART, and the F-117. Declassified documents help demonstrate the
central role that Area 51 played in the development of programs such as
the F-117, and the operational employment of the aircraft. Other
declassified documents reveal Area
51's role in testing foreign radar systems and, during the Cold War,
secretly obtained Soviet MiG fighters.
Area 51
On April 12, 1955 Richard Bissell and Col. Osmund Ritland flew over
Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane. Johnson was the
director of the
Lockheed Corporation's Skunk Works, which, as part of a secret
CIA-Air Force project, codenamed AQUATONE by the CIA and OILSTONE by the
Air Force, was
building a revolutionary spy plane, designated the U-2. Bissell, CIA
head of the project, Ritland his Air Force deputy, Johnson, and
Lockheed's chief test
pilot, were looking for a site where the plane could be tested
safely and secretly.
2
During the trip they discovered, near the northeast corner of the
Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Nevada Proving Ground, what appeared to
be an airstrip
near a salt flat known as Groom Lake. After examining the location
from the ground, the four agreed that it "would make an ideal site for
testing the U-2
and training its pilots." Upon returning to Washington, Bissell
discovered that the land was not part of the AEC's proving ground —
leading him to ask the
commission's chairman to make the Groom Lake area an AEC possession,
a request which was readily granted. President Eisenhower approved the
plan, and the
territory, known by its map designation — Area 51 — was added to the
Nevada Test Site.
3
The site acquired several other designations. Kelly Johnson, in
order to make the remote location seem more palatable his workers began
referring to it as
Paradise Ranch, which was then shortened to the Ranch. An additional
unofficial name would be Watertown Strip — a consequence of the need to
build a paved
runway so that testing could continue when rainwater runoff from
nearby mountains made it impossible to land on Groom Lake. By July 1955,
the base was
ready and personnel from the CIA, Air Force, and Lockheed began to
arrive.
4
Within a year the U-2 program would transition to an operational
program, with flights initially over Eastern Europe and then the Soviet
Union. Bissell and
other senior officials anticipated that the U-2 would have a limited
life before becoming vulnerable to Soviet air defense systems. Before
the end of 1958
they had launched Project GUSTO to find a successor to the U-2,
which resulted in the selection of another Lockheed-designed plane, the
A-12 or OXCART— which was to fly higher than the U-2, far faster
(over Mach 3), and be harder for air defense radars to detect.
5
In November 1959, a little over two years before the first A-12
arrived at Area 51 in late December 1961, a radar test facility was
established there — the
result of contractor Edgerton, Germeshausen & Greer (EG&G)
agreeing to move its Indian Springs, Nevada test facility to Area 51.
Its purpose was to
determine the vulnerability of an OXCART mockup to detection. Area
51 would also become the home to testing programs for two OXCART
derivatives — the
YF-12A KEDLOCK fighter plane and the Air Force's Project EARNING,
which ultimately produced the SR-71 (also designated SENIOR CROWN)
reconnaissance
aircraft — as well as the D-21 TAGBOARD drone that was expected to
be launched from A-12 aircraft.
6
In September 1961, a few months before the first OXCART arrived, the
site was visited by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, who
conveyed his findings
(
Document 1)
to Richard Bissell — who had become the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans
in the summer of 1958, with continued responsibility for the
CIA's secret aircraft projects through his directorate's Development
Projects Division (DPD). Kirkpatrick wrote that his "visit left
reservations in my
mind." One was that the "'Area' appears to be extremely vulnerable
in its present security provisions against unauthorized observation" —
including air
observation. In addition, Kirkpatrick suggested that the project had
reached a stage "where top management at the 'Area 51' needs
consolidation with clear
and precisely defined authority." Finally, he questioned "the
survivability of the program's hardware when and if employed in actual
operations."
Bissell's off-the-cuff reactions were reported in an October 17 memo (
Document 2)
from Bissell's assistant to the acting chief of the DPD. The
author reported Bissell's belief that Kirkpatrick's points about
area security were "well taken," his lack of strong reaction to the
comment about site
management, and his questioning whether the inspector general's
comment about OXCART vulnerability was "appropriate" for Kirkpatrick "to
get himself
involved in." With regard to the issue of security Bissell "was
particularly interested in why we have not yet been able to eject the
various [deleted]
holding property around the Area."
Concern about maintaining secrecy for activities at the site persisted as illustrated by an April 6, 1962 memo (
Document 3)
from DPD executive
officer John McMahon to the division's acting chief. He reported
that he and another DPD official (John Parangosky) had earlier discussed
the idea of
employing a U-2 to produce images of the area and asking
photographic interpreters to determine what was happening at the site.
But given, the upcoming
scheduled launches of CORONA reconnaissance satellites, McMahon
noted that "it might be advisable" to include a pass crossing the Nevada
Test Site, "to see
what we ourselves could learn from satellite reconnaissance of the
Area." That and later missions could be used to assess what deductions
the Soviets could
make "should Sputnik 13 have a reconnaissance capability."
A dozen years later, it was not Soviet reconnaissance that resulted
in interagency discussions and memos concerning exposure of Area 51
activities via
overhead imagery. Rather it was the inadvertent imaging of the area
by American SKYLAB astronauts. Among the memos was one (
Document 4)
from Robert
Singel, the National Reconnaissance Office's deputy director,
concerning the on-going internal government controversy. Another memo (
Document 5)
provided Director of Central Intelligence William Colby with the
latest information on the internal debate and identified key questions
that needed to be
answered before a final decision was made.
7
During the mid-1970s another issue was whether the CIA should
continue Area 51; its major aerial reconnaissance programs, such as the
U-2 and OXCART, no
longer needed the site, but the Air Force still needed the site for
radar testing, development of stealth aircraft, and exploitation of
Soviet MiG aircraft
that the U.S. had acquired. The National Security Council decided
that the Air Force should take over the site. According to a memo (
Document 6)
from deputy director of central intelligence, E.H. Knoche to the Air
Force's chief of staff, David C. Jones. Knoche, the National Security
Council's
Committee on Foreign Intelligence had approved the recommendation
"that management of Area 51 be transferred from CIA to Air Force by
FY-78."
Eventually, the transfer would take place, and the Groom Lake
facility became Detachment 3 of the Air Force Flight Test Center, whose
headquarters were at
Edwards Air Force Base, California.
8
By the mid-1990s, the existence of Area 51 had become widely known —
and the subject of threatened legal action because of environmental
concerns. Seeking
to prevent that from resulting in revelations about activities
conducted at the site President Bill Clinton signed a presidential
determination exempting
the "Air Force's operating location near Groom Lake, Nevada from any
Federal, State, interstate, or local hazardous or solid waste laws that
might require
disclosure of classified information concerning that location to
unauthorized persons" — a determination he reported to congressional
leaders (
Document 8) on January 30, 1996. In September 2003 President George W. Bush made a similar determination, in the form of a memorandum (
Document 9) to the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
Stealth Fundamentals
A key element of the work done at Area 51 was testing the ability of
the reconnaissance
and other aircraft deployed there to evade radar detection. In some
cases the work was based on measures developed after the aircraft was
developed — as
exemplified by the failed RAINBOW project aimed at reducing the
Soviet ability to detect U-2's during their spy flights.
9
In other cases, designers gave the aircraft certain stealth
(low-observable) features — in some cases, based on elaborate
theoretical work.
During the mid-1970s government and contractor experts studied the
problem of reducing the radar cross section of aircraft. Included was a
paper (
Document 11)
by Lockheed's Kelly Johnson that focused on high altitude aircraft such
as the SR-71. In addition, Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical (
Document 12)
reported on a number of aspects of producing a low-observable vehicle.
Another contractor, Boeing reviewed "features of airborne
vehicle configurations that have a primary influence on the
resulting radar signature."(
Document 13).
Based on testing results, the Boeing expert
discussed the impact of features — including engine inlets, nose
shape, body shape, exhaust nozzles, control surfaces, weapons, wing
location, and fuselage
shape — on radar cross section.
By June 1991, Air Force work on stealth had resulted in a number of
projects that it summarized in a review of the technology that it had
just conducted. A
briefing book (
Document 14) discussed fundamentals about stealth, its value, and the four different Air Force programs — the F-117, B-2, F-22, and
Advanced Cruise Missile.
The first of those programs, and the unconventional shape of the aircraft produced, had its origins in a 1962 work (
Document 10)
by Russian
theoretical physicist (and electric engineer) Pytor Ufimtsev — which
did not spur the Russian air force to either classify the work or make
use of it. The
paper,
Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction,
when translated by the Air Force Foreign Technology Division in 1971
would
consist of over 200 pages of mathematical analysis. A foreword
explained that Ufimtsev studied the scattering characteristics of
"reflecting bodies with
abrupt surface discontinuities or with sharp edges." He took into
account "the laws of geometric optics ..., the additional currents
arising in the
vicinity of the edges or borders which have the character of edge
waves and rapidly attenuate with increasing distance from the edge or
border."
Ben Rich, Kelly Johnson's successor as head of the Lockheed Skunk
Works, would report in his memoirs that one afternoon a "Skunk Works
mathematician and
radar specialist named Denys Overholser ... presented me with the
Rosetta Stone breakthrough for stealth technology." Overholser had found
the breakthrough
in Ufimtsev's paper and explained that the Ufimtsev had demonstrated
"how to accurately calculate radar cross sections across the surface of
the wing and
at the edge of the wing and put together these two calculations for
an accurate total."
10
From HAVE BLUE to the F-117
F-117. Photo credit: National Museum of the United States Air Force.
A first step in trying to convert Ufimtsev's theoretical results
into an operational stealth aircraft was an Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA)
project, began in the early 1970s. Designated HAVE BLUE, it resulted
in two experimental aircraft, with a first flight in April 1977. The
Air Force
launched a program, designated SENIOR TREND, to build the F-117 in
November 1978; it eventually produced 59 aircraft. A first flight,
presumably at Area
51, took place in June 1981, and the Air Force declared the F-117
operational in October 1983 with Tonopah Test Range as its new home. Ten
years later, in
November 1988, the government confirmed the existence of the plane,
revealed its designation, and released a picture of the aircraft.
11
In the two years before declassification the program experienced two crashes (
Document 15,
Document 16) that took the lives of the pilots.
Once it was declared operational, the F-117 was available for use in
combat operations. The Air Force nearly used it in the 1986 attacks on
Libya, ordered
by President Reagan in response to Libyan involvement in the La
Belle Disco bombing in West Berlin, but ultimately did not because of
Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger's reluctance to reveal the plane's existence.
12
First combat use would come three years later — in Operation Just Cause (
Document 19,
Document 22) — the operation to unseat and seize
Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega.
But the major use of the F-117 in combat activity took place in
operations targeting sites in Iraq, beginning with Operation DESERT
STORM. These operations
were the subject of an official chronology (
Document 17), an Army War College essay (
Document 18) and the official history of the 37
th Fighter Wing (
Document 19). The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a critical examination of the stealth fighter's
effectiveness (
Document 23) as part of its evaluation of the air war. The GAO found that the F-117 bomb hit range was "highly effective" — varying
between 41 and 60 percent — but it did not reach the 80 percent claimed by the Defense Department.
Other histories of the F-117 wing (which had become the 49
th Wing by 1996) included accounts of its participation in a variety of exercises as
well as its use for coercive diplomacy. According to one history (
Document 26)
F-117s were deployed to Southwest Asia twice between July 1 and
December 31, 1998 for Operations DESERT THUNDER and DESERT FOX. Both
were ordered in response to Iraqi non-compliance with U.N. Security
Council
resolutions, but did not result in combat operations. In 1999,
F-117s did go into combat — in the Balkans — a subject that was
discussed in the January -
June 1999 history (
Document 27) of the 49
th
Fighter Wing. Much of the treatment is redacted from the released
version, although the
declassified version reports that after the first round of strikes
on March 24, 1999, General William Lake told his commanders "everyone is
back safely. So
far the score is F-117s 10, Yugoslav's 0."
13
Deployments to South Korea and Southwest Asia, including use during the Iraq War, as well exercises, are covered in histories (
Document 34,
Document 37) for 2003 and 2004. The 2003 history (
Document 34) and a history —
Black Sheep Over Iraq (
Document 36) — focus
solely on F-117 operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
Black Sheep history covers orders to deploy for combat, the attempted decapitation
strike intended to kill Saddam Hussein, subsequent combat missions, and an assessment of F-117 performance in the war.
The Soviets and Stealth
The Soviet military may not have initially embraced Ufimtsev's work,
but it was inevitable, because of both internal and external
influences, that they
would eventually explore its use for their own aerial programs and
for counteracting U.S. stealth aircraft. During the 1980s, if not
before, the
Intelligence Community and CIA closely reviewed those issues.
In January 1983 former DPD executive officer John McMahon (
Document 3), then the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, informed the director of
the Intelligence Community Staff (
Document 38) that he had asked the Deputy Director of Intelligence for an assessment of Soviet stealth technology.
A little over a year later, the Directorate of Intelligence produced a study (
Document 40) entitled
Soviet Work on Cross Section Reduction Applicable to a Future Stealth Program.
The assessment examined Soviet radar cross section technology and a
variety of potential applications to submarines, reentry vehicles,
aircraft, spacecraft, cruise missiles, and ground vehicles.
14
Among its key judgments was that "the Soviets did not have a Stealth
program in the 1970s" but that "because of the high US interest in this
area, the
Soviets probably began intensified research effort in the early
1980s, which may have led to a developmental program now under way."
15
The same month that the CIA produced that assessment the Agency's
continued interest in further work on Soviet stealth efforts was
indicated by a memo (
Document 42)
from Julian C. Nail, the National Intelligence Officer for Science and
Technology, to Director of Central Intelligence William J.
Casey. Nail observed that the topic was on the agenda for a National
Foreign Intelligence Board meeting in early March 1983, memos were
being prepared for
Casey to send to each principal indicating the importance he
attached to the subject, and that the Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research was seeking to
enhance its analysis of the subject, mainly by getting additional
clearances so the CIA analysts could learn about U.S. research and
development efforts.
How the Soviets might react to U.S. stealth programs was the subject, in
August 1985, of a special national intelligence estimate (
Document 43) —
Soviet Reactions to Stealth.
Two key sections of the estimate focused on the counter-stealth
potential of current and near-term Soviet systems
(including early warning radar, fighter aircraft, surface-to-air
missile, antiaircraft artillery, and command, control, and
communications systems) and
future Soviet technical responses. Another section examined
prospective Soviet stealth developments — including the process of
incorporating stealth
vehicles in Soviet military planning and the acquisition and use of
stealth technology.
One indication that the Air Force may have limited the knowledge and
the ability of U.S. intelligence analysts to use classified data on
U.S. stealth
research and development efforts was a figure labeled "Design
Considerations for Stealth Aircraft" (p.8). Despite the figure's Top
Secret classification,
it was, as acknowledged in a credit line adjacent to the figure,
lifted from an issue of
Aviation Week & Space Technology.
Moreover, that
figure was based on speculation what , at the time, the rumored
stealth fighter might look like — speculation that proved to be
considerably wide of the
mark.
CIA Support to US Stealth Programs
In addition to assessing Soviet stealth programs, the CIA and other
elements of the Intelligence Community provided U.S. stealth efforts
with intelligence
on Soviet forces and capabilities that was relevant to developing U.S.
stealth vehicles and plans for their use. Thus, in a February 1, 1984
memo (
Document 45)
the director of the CIA Office of Scientific and Weapons Research
(OSRW) reported that intelligence support for the U.S. stealth
program included an analysis on "the Soviet threat to an Air Force
Tactical Air Command Program in November 1983."
A month later the OSWR director reported the number of new clearances
(25) that were necessary to implement the stealth analytical effort (
Document 47)
Beyond the total clearances needed, the director indicated the offices
involved and the specific topics to be examined. Thus, air
defense and aircraft systems specialists at OSWR would work on
stealth penetration analysis studies, specialists in the Office of
Soviet Analysis would
conduct strategic studies related to the implications of stealth
capabilities, and other specialists in OSWR would examine Soviet weapons
and technology.
MiGs at Area 51
Besides secret U.S. aircraft work, Area 51 also hosted the study of
secretly acquired Soviet MiG fighters. The first effort involved a
MiG-21, designated
"Fishbed-E" by NATO. Israel acquired the plane in August 1966 when a
captain in the Iraqi air force defected, landing the MiG at an airbase
in northern
Israel — an action that been arranged in advance by the Mossad,
Israel's secret intelligence service. From January 23, 1968 to April 8,
1968 the plane was
loaned to the U.S. Air Force.
16
The MiG, in the Air Force's temporary possession, received a new
designation — the YF-110 — and Area 51 became its new home. The
exploitation effort,
conducted by the specialists from the Air Force Foreign Technology
Division (today known as the National Air and Space Intelligence Center)
was designated
HAVE DOUGHNUT. One report focused on technical characteristics of
the plane, while another was a tactical evaluation. The latter (
Document 50)
had
four primary objectives: (1) evaluating of the effectiveness of
existing of existing tactical maneuvers by the Air Force and Navy combat
aircraft and
associated weapons against the MiG-21, (2) exploiting the tactical
capabilities and limitations of the MiG-21 in air-to-air combat, (3)
optimizing existing
tactics and develop new tactics to defeat the MiG-21, and (4)
evaluating the design, performance, and characteristics of the MiG-21.
The exploitation
reports spelled out the findings (including
Document 50) with historical retrospectives about the effort prepared later (
Document 48,
Document 49).
Two other late 1960s exploitation efforts at Area 51 — both focused
on evaluating the MiG-17 — were designated HAVE DRILL and HAVE FERRY.
The HAVE DRILL
MiG-17 began flying at Groom Lake on February 17, 1969 and flew 172
sorties over 55 days. The HAVE FERRY aircraft, which served as backup to
the HAVE DRILL
aircraft, began flying on April 9, 1969 and flew 52 sorties over 20
days.
17
As with the HAVE DOUGHNUT effort it resulted in a technical report and a
tactical report (April 1970). The results were also the subject of two
more recent
briefings by (
Document 51 and
Document 52) by NASIC representatives.
While the HAVE DOUGHNUT and HAVE DRILL/HAVE FERRY efforts are the
ones whose details have been declassified, they were not the last of MiG
exploitation
efforts at Area 51. Under a program designated CONSTANT PEG, the Air
Force tested other MiGs — acquired by a variety of means — to determine
their
capabilities and vulnerabilities. In the 1970s the effort moved to
Tonopah Test Range, about 70 miles northwest of Area 51.
18
Radar Tests & Other Aircraft
Other aspects of Area 51 activities included tests of covertly
acquired Soviet-radar systems. In November 1970, a project designated
HAVE GLIB, referred to
in a 1976 memo (
Document 6),
began. According to one account "a complex of actual Soviet systems and
replicas" grew around Slater Lake, a mile
northwest of the main base. The Air Force gave the systems such
names as Mary, Kay, Susan, and Kathy and arranged them to "simulate a
Soviet-style air
defense complex."
19
Subsequent to the declassification of the F-117 program, the Air
Force managed two other aircraft programs at Area 51, but neither led to
the production of
operational fleet. Both have been partly declassified, with only
some photos and fact sheets providing a few details about these secret
programs.
One plane, developed by Northrop along with the Air Force and DARPA, was the TACIT BLUE battlefield surveillance plane (
Document 56,
Document 58)
also known as the "Whale." Work began in 1978 and it first flew at Area
51 in February 1982, with the program concluding in 1985 — by
which time it had been flown 135 times. The Air Force fact sheet (
Document 58)
reports that the objective was to "demonstrate that curved surfaces
on an aircraft result in a low radar return signal" and states that
TACIT BLUE "demonstrated that such an aircraft could operate close to
the battlefield
forward line without fear of being discovered by enemy radar."
20
The other, a plane built by the McDonnell-Douglas "Phantom Works" was
known as the BIRD OF PREY, after its resemblance to the Klingon
spacecraft from
Star Trek. The Air Force declassified its existence in 2002, because, according to the fact sheet (
Document 59),
"its design
techniques had become standard practice." The fact sheet described
the plane as a single-seat stealth technology demonstrator used to test
stealth
techniques and "new methods of aircraft design and construction."
The project, which ran from 1992 to 1999, with the first flight in 1996,
included 38
flights altogether.
21
Two additional projects that may have been connected to Area 51 were
associated with the May 2, 2011 raid that resulted in the death of
Osama Bin Laden.
One was the stealth helicopter that carried the Navy SEALs to the
Abbottabad compound. The other was the RQ-170 stealth drone that had
been used to monitor
developments at the compound.
22
A very brief fact sheet (
Document 60) describes the RQ-170 as "a low observable unmanned aircraft system" intended to provide "reconnaissance and
surveillance in support of the joint forces commander."
THE DOCUMENTS
AREA 51
Document 1:
Letter, Lyman Kirpatrick to Richard Bissell, October 13, 1961. Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
This letter from the CIA's Inspector General to the Deputy
Director for Plans reports on his visit to the Development Projects
Division (responsible for
the U-2 and OXCART programs) "Area" — that is, Area 51. The topics
covered include security arrangements (which Kirkpatrick considered
inadequate), on-site
management, and the survivability of the "program's hardware when
and if employed in actual operations."
Document 2:
[Deleted], Assistant to the DD/P, Memorandum for: AC/DPD, Subject:
Inspector General's Memorandum on His Trip to the Area, October 17,
1961. Secret.
Source: CREST.
This memo reports on Bissell's "off-the-cuff" reactions to Kirpatrick's letter (
Document 1).
While he embraced Kirpatrick's comments on security, he had no strong
reaction to his comments concerning on-site management, and questioned
the
proprietary of an inspector general commenting on the issue of
OXCART vulnerability.
Document 3:
John N. McMahon, Executive Officer, DPD, Memorandum for: Acting Chief,
DPD, Subject: Aerial Observation of Area 51, April 6, 1962. Secret.
Source: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Release.
This memo from the DPD's executive officer to its acting chief
discusses the possibility of having Area 51 photographed by either a U-2
or CORONA spy
satellite — as a means of estimating what the Soviet Union might
learn from its own overhead images of the facility.
Document 4:
Robert D. Singel, Memorandum for Chairman, COMIREX, Subject: [Deleted] SKYLAB Photograph, April 11, 1974. Top Secret.
Source: National Reconnaissance Office
This memo from the deputy director of the NRO to the chairman of
the Director of Central Intelligence's Committee on Imagery Requirements
and Exploitation
is the result of a photograph taken by SKYLAB astronauts of Area 51.
It discusses some of the issues to be considered in deciding whether to
release the
photograph.
Document 5:
[Deleted], Memorandum for: The Director of Central Intelligence,
Subject: SKYLAB Imagery [Deleted], April 19, 1974. Confidential.
Source: CREST.
This memo to DCI William Colby, notes that the SKYLAB photograph
of Area 51 was acquired inadvertently and that instructions had been
issued not to
photograph the facility. It also reports that the photo is the
subject of an interagency review and that there was widespread
opposition to its release.
Document 6:
E.H. Knoche, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to General
David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, August 26,
1976. Secret.
Source: RG 340
National Archives and Records Administration.
This letter discusses whether the CIA should continue to be
responsible for the management of Area 51 or if the Air Force should
assume responsibility. It
identifies HAVE GLIB — the evaluation of foreign radar and threat
systems — as the largest Defense Department project at the site at that
time.
Document 7:
United States Air Force, Det 3 SP, n.d. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This document is widely reported to be a manual for Detachment 3
of the Air Force Security Police, responsible for security at Area 51.
It specifies the
cover story to be employed by members of the security force to
explain their activities.
Document 8:
William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Presidential Determination 95-45, January 30, 1996. Unclassified.
Source: www.gpo.gov.
This letter from President Clinton, notes that his determination
exempted the Air Force's operating location "near Groom Lake, Nevada
from any Federal,
State, interstate, or local hazardous or solid waste laws that might
require the disclosure of classified information concerning that
operating location to
unauthorized persons."
Document 9:
George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, Presidential Determination No. 2003-39,
Subject: Classified
Information Concerning the Air Force's Operating Location Near
Groom Lake, Nevada, September 16, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: www.whitehouse.gov
This memorandum reaffirms President Clinton's 1995 presidential determination (
Document 8).
STEALTH FUNDAMENTALS
Document 10a, 10b, 10c:
P. Ya. Ufimtsev, Methods of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction, 1971. Unclassified.
Source: Air Force Freedom of Information Act Release
Ufimtsev's 1962 work, translated by the Air Force Foreign
Technology Division (today, the National Air and Space Intelligence
Center), provides the
fundamental theoretical/mathematical basis for the F-117.
Document 11:
Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
"Reduction of Radar Cross Section of Large High Altitude Aircraft," n.d.
(but circa 1975).
Classification Not Available.
Source: Air Force Freedom of Information Act Release.
Most of this paper, written by the first head of the Lockheed Skunk
Works, who supervised development of the U-2 and A-12 (OXCART), consists
of figures
related to the brief discussion of the relationship between stealth
and aircraft shape.
Document 12:
R. W. Lorber, R. W. Wintersdorff, and G.R. Cota, AFAL-TR-74-320, Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical, Low-RCS Vehicle Study, January 31, 1974. Secret.
Source: Air Force Freedom of Information Act Release.
This report describes the research performed by Teledyne Ryan
under an Air Force contract on low-radar cross section aerial vehicles
as well as some of the
results obtained.
Document 13:
John D. Kelly, Boeing Aerospace Company, "Configuration Design for Low RCS," September 1, 1975. Secret.
Source: Air Force Freedom of Information Act Release.
This paper discusses the impact on the radar cross section of
aircraft of the design of different regions of the vehicle — including
the nose, tail,
broadside — as well as the impact of skin material. It also
discusses the design a low RCS missile.
Document 14:
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Stealth Technology Review, 10-14 June 1991, n.d.
Source: www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Science_and_Technology/Other/263.pdf.
This briefing book consists of five tabs, which concern the value
and evolution of stealth, the F-117, the B-2, the F-22, and the
advanced cruise missile.
F-117 OPERATIONS
Document 15:
Major General Peter T. Kemp, Commander, USAF Tactical Fighter
Warfare Center, to TFWC/JA, Subject: Aircraft Accident - F-117, 81-0792,
July 11, 1986,
January 14, 1987.
Secret/Special Access Required.
Secret w/att: Report of Investigation (Extract).
Source: Air Force Freedom of Information Act Release.
This extract provides a statement of facts concerning the fatal crash of a F-117A aircraft on July
11, 1986. It covers,
inter alia, crew qualifications, the history of the flight, the mission, the briefing and preflight, the flight, impact,
rescue, and crash response.
Document 16:
Lt. Col. John T. Manclark, 57 FWW/AT, Nellis AFB, N, AFR 110-14 USAF
Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, 14 October 1987 - Tonopah Test Range
, December 8, 1987.
Secret/Special Access Required.
Source: Air Force Freedom of Information Act Release.
This extract is a summary of facts concerning the October 14,
1987 crash of a F-117A that claimed the life of its pilot. As with the
report of the on the
July 1986 crash (Document 15), it covers —
inter alia — crew qualifications, the history of the flight, the mission, the briefing and
preflight, the flight, impact, rescue, and crash response.
Document 17:
Harold P. Myers, Office of History, 37th Fighter Wing, Twelfth Air Force, Tactical Air Command, Nighthawks over Iraq: A Chronology of the F-117A Stealth Fighter in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, January 9, 1992. Unclassified.
Source: Editor's Collection.
A two-page introduction is followed by a 32-page chronology of
F-117A information related to operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
from August 17,
1990 to February 28, 1991. The information include concerns
personnel, deployments, administrative matters, exercises, and
operations (pp. 8-36).
Document 18:
Arthur P. Weyermuller, Stealth Employment in the Tactical Air Force (TAF) - A Primer on Its Doctrine and Operational Use
(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1992). Unclassified.
Source: www.dtic.mil
This study focuses on the history of stealth development, the
roles and missions of the F-117A and its performance during Desert
Storm, and an assessment
of how stealth technology fits into Air Force aerospace doctrine. It
also discusses next generation stealth aircraft, specifically the F-22
fighter and B-2
bomber.
Document 19:
Vincent C. Breslin, 37th Fighter Wing, History of the 37th Fighter Wing, 5 October 1989 - 31 December 1991, Volume 1 - Narrative, May 22, 1992. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
In addition to a chronology of events, this history includes a discussion of the creation of the 37
th
Fighter Wing (established to replace the
covert group established to oversee development of the F-117A while
it was still a classified program), the "quest for normalization," F-117
operations in
Panama (Operation Just Cause) and Iraq (Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm), and events from the end of Desert Storm to the end of
1991.
Document 20a, 20b:
Vincent C. Breslin, 37th Fighter Wing, History of the 37th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 8 July 1992, Closeout, Volume 1 - Narrative, August 11, 1992.
Classification Not Available.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
The 37
th Fighter Wing (
Document 19)
at Tonopah Test Range was inactivated on July 8, 1992, with F-117A
fighters being transferred to a
new unit, based at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. This history
contains a discussion of the inactivation, fully redacted sections on
mission revision
and an operational readiness exercise - as well as treatments of the
the employment of the F-117A in airshows, transfer of aircraft to
Holloman, and a
number of other topics.
Document 21a:
Office of Public Affairs, Department of the Air Force, Fact Sheet 93-11, F-117A Stealth Fighter,
November 1993. Unclassified.
Document 21b:
Department of the Air Force, Fact Sheet, F-117 A Nighthawk, October 2005. Unclassified.
Sources: Air Force Office of Public Affairs, www.af.mil
These fact sheets, issued twelve years apart, describe the
mission, features, background, and general characteristics of the
F-117A. The second fact sheet
contains details of the plane's employment in Desert Storm, the
Balkans, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Document 22:
Ronald H. Cole, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1998 - January 1990, 1995. Unclassified.
Source: www.dtic.mil.
The focus of this history is the involvement of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff in the planning and direction of
combat operations in
Panama. Part of the history discusses the decision to use the F-117A
as part of the operation — its first operational use — and its
employment.
Document 23:
General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, June 1997. Unclassified.
Source: General Accounting Office.
This study focuses on the use and performance of aircraft and
other munitions in Desert Storm, including the F-117, the validity of
Defense Department
claims about weapon systems' performance (particularly systems using
advanced technology), the relationship between weapon system cost and
performance, and
the extent to which Desert Storm air campaign objectives were
satisfied. Among its findings was that while F-117 bomb hit range varied
between 41 and 60
percent, which the report characterized as "highly effective," the
range was less than the 80-percent rate report after the war by the
Defense Department.
Document 24:
Gregg S. Henneman and David Libby, 49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 July 1996 - 31 December 1997, Narrative, Volume No. 1, May 28, 1998. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
With the inactivation of the 37
th Fighter Wing (
Document 20) and transfer of the F-117A fleet to Holloman AFB, they were assigned to the
49
th Fighter Wing. This history focuses on mission and
organization, operations and training (including operations against
Iraqi targets, and
partcipation in the Red Flag 97-1 exercise), and aircraft upgrades.
Document 25:
Gregory S. Henneman,
49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 30 June 1998, Narrative, Volume No. 1, October 22,
1998. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
As with the history for the preceding eighteen months (
Document 24)
the main focus of this history is mission and organization and
operations and
training. In addition to its discussion of F-117A deployment to
Southwest Asia in response to developments in Iraq the history also
discusses several
exercises — Spirit Hawk '98 (described as "the Air Force's first
ever low observable combat exercise"), Combat Hammer 98-04 (a weapons
system evaluation
program exercise) — as well as deployment in support of Fighter
Weapons Instructor Course.
Document 26:
Gregory S. Henneman,
49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 July - 31 December 1998, Narrative, Volume No. 1, May 19, 1999.
Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
This history discusses deployments to in support of operations in
the Balkans and Southwest Asia. The two Southwest Asia deployments —
Operation Desert
Thunder and Operation Desert Fox — were in response to Iraqi
non-compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and did not result
in combat operations.
Document 27:
William P. Alexander and Gregory S. Henneman, 49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 30 June 1999, Narrative, Volume 1, n.d. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
This history follows the standard format for 49
th
Fighter Wing histories — covering mission and organization, operations
and training, and
maintenance. The chapter on operations includes a discussion of the
F-117A deployment to Europe and its use against Serbian targets.
Document 28:
William P. Alexander and Gregory S. Henneman, 49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 July - 31 December 1999, Narrative, Volume 1, n.d. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
In addition to discussing the role of F-117A aircraft in two
exercises — Spirit Hawk 99 at Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho and EFX at
Nellis AFB, Nevada — the history also contains a discussion of
upgrades to the F-117, including an upgrade to the infrared acquisition
designation system that "would allow
F-117 pilots to 'look' through clouds, greatly increasing the
aircraft's capability."
Document 29:
William P. Alexander and Tracey S. Anderson, 49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 30 June 2000, Narrative, Volume 1, n.d. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
The primary deployment discussed in this history was a deployment
to Nellis Air Force Base, to take part in a "firepower demonstration"
called CAPSTONE. It
involved two F-117As dropping GBU-10 bombs on specified targets.
Document 30:
William P. Alexander, 49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 July - 31 December 2000, Narrative, Volume 1, n.d. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
The history's discussion of operations and training includes
examination of two exercises that involved F-117A participation - RED
FLAG 01-01 and CAPSTONE.
The first is described as
"the first low observable (LO) integrated RED FLAG exercise to be flown
of Nellis AFB." The latter involved, as did the identically named
exercise in the
first half of the year (Document 29),
F-117A's dropping two GBU-10 bombs on specified targets.
Document 31:
William P. Alexander, 49th Fighter Wing, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 30 June 2001, Narrative, Volume 1
, January 28, 2003. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
As with earlier 49
th Fighter Wing histories, this one
discusses mission and organization, operations and training, and
miscellaneous activities
(including maintenance). While there were no operational
deployments, the history reports on the deployment of aircraft,
equipment, and personnel to
several bases around the United States as well as F-117A involvement
in RED FLAG 01-02.
Document 32: History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 July - 31 December 2001, n.d., Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
This history covers mission and organization and deployments of the 49
th Fighter Wing.
Document 33:
William P. Alexander and Terri J. Berling, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 31 December 2002, Narrative, Volume 1,
n.d. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release.
Despite its classification this history is heavily redacted, but
does discuss F-117A participation in a European theater exercise named
Operation Coronet
Nighthawk.
Document 34:
William P. Alexander and Terri J. Berling, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 31 December 2003, Narrative, Volume 1,
n.d.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release
Among the topics examined in this history are F-117A deployments
to the Middle East (and subsequent participation in Operation Iraqi
Freedom) and South
Korea as well as F-117A participation the Foal Eagle (Korea) and Red
Flag (Nellis Air Force Base) exercises.
Document 35:
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3 -3.18, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, F-117, October 19, 2004.
Unclassified/For Official Use Only.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release
This manual is intended to provide "aircrew the information need
to make the right decisions during any phase of a tactical mission." Its
chapters cover
mission preparation, formation, aircraft basics and instruments,
air-to-surface elements of a mission, air refueling, low altitude
operations, night and
adverse weather operations, and night systems.
Document 36:
Gregg Henneman, Black Sheep Over Iraq: The 8th Fighter Squadron in Operation Iraqi Freedom, November 2004. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release
This study explores the role of F-117A aircraft in the 2003
conflict with Iraq. In addition to an examination of the F-117A
background, it examines the
orders to deploy the F-117A for combat, the attempted decapitation
strike, subsequent combat missions, maintenance, and assessment of F-117
performance,
and redeployment.
Document 37:
William P. Alexander and Terri J. Berling, History of the 49th Fighter Wing, 1 January - 31 December 2004, Narrative, Volume 1,
n.d. Secret.
Source: Air Combat Command Freedom of Information Act Release
This history contains a chronology of 49
th Fighter
Wing activities, and chapters on mission and organization, operations —
including an
extensive discussion of F-117A deployment to South Korea and
participation the Eagle Flag 2004/0B exercise — and mission capability
for the F-117A and
other aircraft.
THE SOVIETS AND STEALTH
Document 38:
John N. McMahon, Memorandum for: Director, Intelligence Community
Staff, Subject: Soviet Stealth Technology, January 10, 1983. Secret.
Source: CREST.
This brief memo from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
notes that he had asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Robert
Gates) to produce a
paper on Soviet stealth technology.
Document 39:
Lawrence K. Gershwin, Memorandum for: Director of Central
Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Briefing
on Soviet Stealth
Efforts, January 30, 1984. Secret.
Source: CREST.
This memo notes that the Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council had asked the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic
Programs, Lawrence K.
Gershwin, to prepare, in conjunction with the Office of Scientific
and Weapons Research (OSWR), a briefing for Senator Sam Nunn
on Soviet stealth technology.
Document 40:
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, SW 84-10015, Soviet Work on Radar Cross Section Reduction Applicable to a Future Stealth Program, February 1984. Secret.
Source: CREST.
This the two main sections of this assessment cover Soviet radar
cross section technology (including the theoretical base, measurement
capability,
materials, and transfer of technology) and applications (to
submarines, reentry vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft, cruise missiles, and
ground vehicles). The
key judgments section states that the authors "feel certain that the
Soviets did not have a Stealth program in the 1970s" but that "the
Soviets probably
began an intensified research effort in the early 1980s which may
have led to a developmental program now under way."
Document 41:
Julian C. Nail, National Intelligence Officer for Science and
Technology, Note for the Director, Subject: Soviet Low Observable
(Stealth) Technology,
February 23, 1984. Secret.
Source: CREST.
This note to the Director of Central Intelligence summarizes
efforts under throughout the Intelligence Community to produce
assessments and other products
concerning Soviet stealth technology.
Document 42:
Julian C. Nail, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Distribution of SNIE on
The Soviet Reactions to Stealth, July 24, 1985. Secret
Source: CREST.
This memo concerns limiting the distribution of the a special
national intelligence estimate on Soviet reactions to stealth. The
author suggests that
rather than distributing 50 copies the estimate should be
disseminated to 37 offices/individuals.
Document 43:
Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 11-7/9-85/L, Soviet Reactions to Stealth, August 1985, Top Secret
.
Source: CIA Electronic Reading Room.
This estimate is described as "an effort to assess at the
national level the Soviet capability and intention to respond to the US
[stealth] challenge."
Topics covered in the discussion include the concept of stealth, the
counter-stealth potential of current and near-term Soviet systems,
future Soviet
technical responses, ballistic missile defenses, other defense
options, prospective Soviet stealth developments, research facilities,
aerodynamic systems,
ballistic missile systems, and intelligence gaps.
Document 44:
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, US Stealth Programs and Technology: Soviet Exploitation of the Western Press, August
1, 1988. Secret.
Source: CIA Historical Review Program Release.
This paper examines the intersection of Soviet examination of
Western press reports on U.S. stealth efforts and indigenous Soviet work
in the area.
CIA STEALTH EFFORTS
Document 45:
[Deleted], Director of Scientific and Weapons Research,
Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Intelligence, Subject: CIA's Stealth
Efforts [Deleted],
February 1, 1984, w/att: CIA Intelligence Support to US Stealth
Programs, Secret/Noforn.
Source: CREST.
The attachment to the February 1, 1984 memo notes that the CIA's
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research had been providing direct
support to US stealth
efforts since 1980 and provides specific examples. It also describes
"several initiatives ... to better support policy makers." The February
1 memo
outlines that the author believes "we have done well, what we have
not done, and recommendations for future support."
Document 46:
William J. Casey, Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Intelligence, Subject: CIA's Stealth Efforts, February 2, 1984. Secret
Source: CREST.
This memo is DCI Casey's response to the February 1 and its attachment.
Document 47:
[Deleted], Director of Scientific and Weapons Research,
Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence,
Subject: Implementation of CIA's Stealth Analytical Effort,
March 1, 1984.
Source: CREST.
This memo reports on the number of clearances necessary for the CIA
to carry out the analytical program concerning stealth suggested by the
Director of the
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. It indicates the both the
national intelligence and CIA entities that would be involved as well
as the specific
topics to be investigated.
EXPLOITATION
Document 48:
Thomas R. Woodford, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, HAVE DOUGHNUT Tactical Evaluation, n.d. Unclassified.
Source: www.dreamlandresort.com/black_projects, permission of T.D. Barnes
This briefing reports on the 1968 tactical evaluation effort
designated HAVE DOUGHNUT - which focused on a MiG-21 aircraft provided
to the U.S. by Israel.
The purpose of the effort was to evaluate the effectiveness of Air
Force and Navy tactical maneuvers against the MiG-21, optimize tactics
and develop new
ones needed to defeat MiG-21s, and evaluate the design, performance,
and operation characteristics of the MiG-21.
Document 49:
Rob Young, Project HAVE DOUGHNUT - Exploitation of the MIG-21,
n.d. Unclassified.
www.dreamlandresort.com/black_projects, permission of T.D. Barnes
This briefing covers,
inter alia, the background of the HAVE DOUGHNUT effort (
Document 48,
Document 50)
; data
on
sorties flown; lessons learned; the positive features, shortcomings,
and unique design features of the MiG; and Air Force and Navy responses
to the findings.
Document 50:
Defense Intelligence Agency, FTD-CR-20-13-69-INT, Volume II, Have Doughnut (U) Tactical, August 1, 1969.
Source: www.scribd.com
This 310-page report, produced by the Air Force Foreign
Technology Division, on behalf of DIA, presents the detailed results of
the tactical evaluation,
the MiG-21 obtained from Israel. The report focused on evaluating
the effectiveness of existing tactical maneuvers by Air Force and Navy
combat aircraft
and associated weapons against the MiG-21. It also was intended to
exploit tactical capabilities and limitations of the MiG-21 in aerial
combat and help
optimize existing tactics and develop new tactics to defeat the
MiG-21.
Document 51:
Thomas R. Woodford, HAVE DRILL/HAVE FERRY Tactical Evaluation, n.d., Unclassified.
Source: www.dreamlandresort.com/black_projects, permission of T.D. Barnes
This briefing on the 1969 exploitation of a MiG-17 provides
weapon system highlights, key statements by Air Force and Navy officials
- as well as the
evaluation, general conclusions, and recommendations of the Tactical
Air Command and Navy.
Document 52:
Rob Young, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, HAVE DRILL/HAVE FERRY - Exploitation of the Soviet MiG-17F, n.d. Unclassified.
Source: www.dreamlandresort.com/black_projects, permission of T.D. Barnes
This briefing describes the specifics of the exploitation
efforts, designated HAVE DRILL and HAVE FERRY, of two versions of the
Soviet MiG-17F fighter
plane. It specifies the versions of the plane in the possession of
the Foreign Technology Division (now the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center),
U.S. test equipment, the testing effort, and lessons learned.
ODDS & ENDS
Document 53:
Department of Defense Instruction S-5230.19, Subject: PROJECT HAVE NAME Security Classification Guide, July 2, 1979. Secret.
Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release.
This heavily redacted instruction from 1979 may pertain to an aircraft or radar testing program (similar to HAVE GLIB,
Document 6) at Groom Lake.
Document 54: "Stealth," August 29, 1980. Top Secret.
Source: Record Group 59, PPS Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, August 1980, National Archives and Records Administration.
This memo, found in the Anthony Lake's State Department file for the 1977-1981 years, is an attempt at stealth humor.
Document 55:
Walter D. Clark, Northrop Grumman Corporation, United States Patent, No. 7,108,230 B2, Aircraft with Topside Only Spoilers,
September 19, 2006. Unclassified.
Source:
www.spacepatents.com/patented_inventions/pat7108230.pdf.
This patent is for a low-observable aircraft with improved roll control characteristics.
Document 56: DARPA Technology Transition
(Arlington, Va.: Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, 1997), Unclassified.
Source: www.darpa.mil
These pages from this DARPA history cover the stealth fighter, TACIT BLUE (
Document 53) and HAVE BLUE/F-117 programs.
Document 57:
EAFB Instruction 31-17, Security Procedures for Inadvertent Tracking and Sensor Acquisition of Low Observable and Sight Sensitive Programs,
November 14, 2005. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org).
This instruction from the commander of Edwards Air Force Base in
California assigns agency responsibilities "during inadvertent or
unauthorized tracking of
sight-sensitive and low observable (LO) tests assets within the
R-2508 complex located at Edwards." It also notes that "it is strictly
forbidden to train
tracking sensors ... on any LO or sight sensitive assets."
Document 58:
National Air Force Museum Fact Sheet, Northrop Tacit Blue, n.d. Unclassified.
Source: www.nationalmuseum.af.mil
This fact sheet provides basic details on the history of the TACIT BLUE surveillance aircraft (
Document 51), that flew at Area 51, but was never put
into production. It also provides data on the planes specifications and perofmance.
Document 59: U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet, Boeing Bird of Prey, n.d. Unclassified.
Source: www.nationalmuseum.af.mil
This fact sheet provides a short history of the Bird of Prey
aircraft developed by the McDonnell-Douglas Phantom Works (later
acquired by Boeing). It provides information on the length of the
program, its first flight, the number of flights, and the purpose of the
program.
Document 60: U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet, RQ-170 Sentinel, December 10, 2009. Unclassified.
Source: www.af.mil.
This very brief fact sheet acknowledged the existence and mission,
of the RQ-170 drone – which had been spotted in use over Afghanistan
and had been referred to as the "Beast of Kandahar."
Notes
[1] Among the non-fiction books on Area 51, are David Darlington,
Area 51 - The Dreamland Chronicles: The Legend of America's Most Secret Military Base
(New York: Henry Holt, 1997);
Phil Patton,
Dreamland: Travels Inside the Secret World of Roswell and Area 51 (New York:
Villard, 1998); Annie Jacobsen,
Area 51: An Uncensored History of America's Top Secret Military Base
(Boston: Little, Brown, 2011). For a critical review of Jacobsen's book, see Robert
S. Norris and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Dreamland Fantasies,"
Washington Decoded
(www.washingtondecoded.com), July 11, 2011. Also, see Peter W.
Merlin, "It's No Secret - Area 51 was Never Classified," available at
www.dreamlandresort.com/pete/no_secret.html.
[2] Gregory Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
(Washington, D.C.: Central
Intelligence Agency, 1992), p. 56. The history is available at:
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434, posted on August 15, 2013.
[6] Ibid., pp. 274, 284.
The OXCART, KEDLOCK, TAGBOARD, and SR-71 Programs will
be the subject of a future electronic briefing book.
[7]
For the SKYLAB incident see, Dwayne Day, "Astronauts and Area 51: The Skylab Incident,"
The Space Review (www.thespacereview.com), January 9, 2006.
[8] Trevor Paglen,
Blank Spots: The Dark Geography of the Pentagon's Secret World
(New York:
Dutton, 2009), p. 41.
[9] Pedlow and Welzenbach,
The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance,
p. 129-130, 259.
[10] Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos,
Skunks Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), pp. 19-20. Overholser was one of three authors of a patent (5,250,
950) filed on February 13, 1979 (which they assigned to Lockheed) for a low-observable aircraft.
[11]
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Technology Transition
(Arlington, Va.: DARPA, n.d., but circa 1998-2000), p. 66.
[12] Rich and Janos,
Skunk Works
, p. 96.
[13] Use in the Balkans resulted in the loss of one plane, which was turned over to Russia,
although the pilot was recovered. See Darrell Whitcomb, "The Night They Saved Vega 31,"
Air Force Magazine
, December 2006, pp. 70-74.
[14]
The United States investigated the employment of stealth
characteristics in satellites, ships, and missiles - specifically, the
MISTY imagery satellite, the SEA SHADOW surface vessel, and
the advance cruise missile. See, Jeffrey T. Richelson,
"Satellite in the Shadows,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
May/June 2005; "Sea Shadow," www.lockheedmartin.com, accessed October 21, 2013;
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Technology Transition, p. 115.
[15] Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
Soviet Work on Radar Cross Section Reduction Applicable to a Future Stealth Program
, February 1984, p. iii.
[16] Ian Black and Benny Morris,
Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services,
(New York: Grove, Weindenfeld, 1993), pp. 206-207; John Lowery, "Have Doughnut,"
Air Force Magazine
, June 2010, pp. 64-67; T.D. Barnes, "Exploitation of Soviet MiGs at Area 51,"
http://area51specialprojects.com/migs_area51.html, accessed November 20, 2010.
[17] Barnes, "Exploitation of Soviet MiGs at Area 51."
[18] "Air Force declassifies elite aggressor program," November 13, 2006, www.af.mil. For
histories of the effort see: Gaillard R. Peck, Jr.,
America's Secret MiG Squadron: The Red Eagles of CONSTANT PEG
(Long Island, N.Y. Osprey, 2012); Steve Davies,
Red Eagles:America's Secret MiGs
(Long Islands, N.Y.: Osprey, 2008).
[19] "Slater Lake,"
Roadrunners Internationale Monthly House Six News and Gossip
, October 1,
2008, p. 8.
[20] For an account of the TACIT BLUE effort, see Peter Grier, "The (Tacit) Blue Whale,"
Air Force Magazine
, August 1996.
[21] For an account of the BIRD OF PREY program, see Bill Sweetman, "Bird of Prey,"
Popular Science
, January 2003, pp. 44-49.
[22] Sean D. Naylor, "Mission helo was secret stealth Black Hawk," www.armytimes.com, May
4, 2011.
Perhas we must look for alien